Maneuver Warfare is the Key to Israeli Victory- English summary

In this 2021 HaShiloach essay, Dr. Omer Dostri, dispels the widely held assumption that successful counterinsurgencies cannot be decisively defeated on the battlefield, and must instead be managed through a combination of deterrence and diplomacy. This assumption, Dostri argues, is the product of Western nations overlearning the lessons of failed counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

In this piece, Dostri explains why these failures should not be considered evidence of the inability of armed forces to confront de-centralized insurgent groups, but rather as evidence of the inevitable failure of counterinsurgency efforts that do not include the assertive deployment of ground forces. In Israel’s case, he asserts, only a return to “maneuver warfare” – which makes ample and effective use of ground troops – will allow the IDF to achieve lasting gains against the terror groups that threaten the Jewish state.

In making this case, Dostri highlights five examples in recent military history where maneuver-warfare tactics were effectively used to deal with highly de-centralized insurgent groups:

1. Britain’s victory in its war against communist rebels in Malaya (1954-1960)
2. Britain’s successful repression of the Mau-Mau Rebellion in Kenya (1952-1956)
3. France’s war against Algerian rebels (1954-1962)
4. Sri Lanka’s campaign against the Tamil Tigers (2006-2009)
5. The American offensive against the Vietcong during Operation Cedar Falls (1967)
6. The decisive victory that Israel achieved against Palestinian terrorists during Operation Defensive Shield (2002)

While the ultimate outcomes in each of these conflicts varied depending on a wide range of factors, Dostri notes that major victories were achieved in each of these cases through the aggressive and dynamic use of armed forces to locate, confront, and eradicate insurgent threats. In contrast, he notes that the failures experienced by the armed forces in each of these respective conflicts were the result of the abandonment of maneuver tactics in favor of more modern, static, and deterrence-oriented counterinsurgency strategies.

Having made that case, Dostri uses the second half of his essay to address a related question: If maneuver warfare is so effective, why does the IDF no longer incorporate it into its strategy?

In answering that question, Dostri points to two phenomena. The first cause of Israel’s abandonment of maneuver tactics, Dostri argues, is tied to the way Israel’s defense system has changed. On the one hand, this change is a result in the decline in threats from state-level actors, and Israel’s subsequent need to focus on combatting non-conventional opponents in densely populated areas. On the other hand, the defensive has changed as a result of Israel’s technological advantage over its opponents – particularly regarding air power and missile defense. In order to leverage its greatest advantages to meet its most pressing threats, Israel has therefore opted to deemphasize ground offensives and instead focus on using defense technology to manage terror threats.

The second cause of the IDF’s abandonment of maneuver warfare is, in Dostri’s words, “the decline of the decisive victory mindset.” Dostri traces this decline to the influential Institute for the Study of Operational Doctrine (ISOD), a now-shuttered department within the IDF that was founded during the early 1990s and sought to stress the need for “limited conflict” given Israel’s engagement in “imbalanced warfare.” Explicitly inspired by the writings of post-modernists philosophers and ethicists – especially the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari – the ISOD argued that the IDF needed to shift its focus away from “linear military thought” in favor of a “multidimensional campaign” aimed toward “undermin[ing] the rationale of enemy systems.” Such an effort would include military forces, but the ISOD strongly de-emphasized the importance battlefield victory while stressing the importance of economics, diplomacy, and culture.

Dostri concludes by arguing that these two phenomena –one material and one cultural – together led Israel to neglect the central importance of ground forces and maneuver tactics. “War,” he emphasizes, “including one in which the sides are not balanced in terms of power, can be decided by – and only by – the use of ground forces.” If is to recover its ability to achieve decisive victory, therefore, Dostri insists the leadership of the IDF will need to return to the maneuver-warfare doctrine it once relied on.

Dr. Omer Dostri is an expert in strategy, military, and national security. He holds a Ph.D. in political science specializing in military and security studies. Additionally, he serves as a researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS).

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